The present study departs from this dominant view of how a lack of board social independence from management affects a board's contribution to strategic decision making. The perspective developed in this study first builds on prior literature in which a board's role in an organization has been broadly conceived as including two different forms of administration: the provision of advice and counsel and the exercise of oversight and control (cf. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . I then develop a theoretical framework that draws from the literatures on advice seeking and social ties in organizations to consider how social factors such as trust and perceived social obligations in CEO-board relationships may promote rather than hinder board involvement and effectiveness in administering a firm. In particular, although existing perspectives tend to suggest that a lack of independence should reduce a board's involvement and effectiveness in firm administration, this study examines how social ties between top managers and outside directors may facilitate board involvement by encouraging the provision of advice and counsel in the strategy-making process.
The theoretical framework developed in this study also addresses the issue of when this alternative model of board social independence and involvement is more or less applicable than the more traditional empirical model that focuses primarily on how board independence affects control. In particular, I explore how managerial incentive alignment may affect whether social ties between a CEO and board enhance involvement by encouraging CEO-board collaboration rather than reduce board involvement by hindering vigilant control. The proposed theoretical framework was tested with a comprehensive data set that combines longitudinal archival data on board structure, CEO compensation, and performance with primary survey data from a large sample of both top managers and outside directors regarding processes and dynamics in CEO-board relationships. The following section first describes the traditional perspective on how social ties in CEO-board relationships affect board involvement in strategic decision making and then develops an alternative "collaboration model" of the relationship between CEO-board social ties and board involvement in firm administration.
CEO-BOARD SOCIAL TIES AND BOARD INVOLVEMENT The Independent Board Model
Much of the empirical literature examining how CEO-board relationships influence board involvement in firm governance is predicated on the assumption that effective boards influence corporate strategy and performance primarily by monitoring management on behalf of shareholders. For instance, Walsh and Seward (1990) described the board as an internal control mechanism, and Kosnik (1987 Kosnik ( , 1990 ) emphasized the role of outside directors in disciplining managerial decision making. Moreover, governance researchers have stressed that effective corporate directors serve shareholders by actively evaluating managerial performance (Boyd, 1994; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; .
Theoretical support for the importance of board monitoring as a form of involvement is rooted in agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . According to this perspective, the function of boards is to reduce agency costs resulting from the delegation of strategic decision making, or "decision management," to top executives by exercising "decision control," which involves monitoring managerial decision making and performance (Fama & Jensen, 1983: 303) . In doing so, boards rely crucially upon outside directors, who are considered less likely than insiders to "collude with managers to expropriate residual claimants" (Fama & Jensen, 1983: 315) . The formal independence possessed by outsiders is assumed to permit more objective evaluation. Several studies have examined the influence of board independence on director involvement in strategic decision making. Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt (1993) and Judge and Zeithaml (1992) provided evidence that including more outside directors on a board increased board involvement (cf. Pearce & Zahra, 1991) . These studies have suggested that the presence of more outside directors might promote involvement by raising the level of monitoring and control.
Researchers have also recognized variation in the extent to which outside directors are truly independent. Although outside board members are formally independent of top management, powerful social and psychological factors are thought to compromise their willingness and ability to objectively monitor managerial performance. From this perspective, CEOs use their influence over director selection to render boards passive by favoring the appointment of personal friends and other individuals with whom they share close social ties ( Thus, the provision of advice has been recognized as a potentially important form of board involvement, but empirical researchers have neither explicitly modeled advisory relations nor examined how social factors may enhance a board's ability to exercise this function. Whereas the independent board model focuses on how social ties in the CEO-board relationship may diminish board involvement in firm decision making by reducing monitoring activity, it is suggested here that boards may provide advice and counsel as well as engage in control and that social ties may increase the prominence of advisory interactions as a form of involvement. Social ties with outside directors should enhance the propensity of top managers to solicit their advice on strategic issues while also increasing the outside directors' tendency to offer such advice. According to the larger literature on advice seeking, a primary inhibitor to seeking advice is the perceived effect it could have on the advice seeker's status. Employees tend to believe that others will view their need for assistance as an admission of uncertainty or dependency and as an indication that they are less than fully competent or self-reliant (Blau, 1955; Rosen, 1983) . Moreover, individuals seeking advice from a superior may need to disclose the existence of problems and to admit their own limitations in solving them-implicitly or explicitly-thus relinquishing power derived from information asymmetry in the agency relationship (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) .
This concern about losing status has been shown to inhibit a variety of different kinds of advice seeking. Allen (1977) showed that engineers sought relatively few technical ideas from others because they feared that such requests would engender skepticism about their competence. Ashford and Northcraft (1992) found evidence that feedback seeking by managers was impeded by impression management concerns, or a fear of appearing uncertain or dependent, and these concerns were particularly salient in an evaluative context, when the information providers (e.g., directors) were in a position to evaluate the person seeking information (e.g., a CEO). Studies have shown, however, that personal relationships increase employees' tendency to seek advice from either friends or others in their work units by creating a sense of social security that reduces the perceived risk (Anderson & Williams, 1996; Fischer, 1982; Rosen, 1983) . Personal ties encourage advice seeking by enhancing mutual trust. Trust has been described as the willingness to take risks, or to make oneself vulnerable (cf. Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) . Thus, social ties should encourage CEO advice seeking by increasing a CEO's willingness to take the perceived social and professional risks associated with such behavior. Much research in organizational behavior has shown that interpersonal trust promotes cooperative problem-solving activity in groups (Zand, 1972) The literature on helping behavior also suggests that people feel more comfortable offering advice to individuals with whom they have a social relationship, and research on friendship has shown that people feel socially obligated to give advice to friends who appear in need of assistance (Shah & Jehn, 1993) . Moreover, dyadic social ties may have additional, board-level effects. The small-groups literature suggests that as the proportion of individuals offering advice increases, social conformity pressures may increase the likelihood that remaining group members will engage in similar behavior (Hackman, 1992 
Board Involvement and Firm Performance
Prior evidence regarding the ultimate performance consequences of board independence from management has been inconsistent (cf. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) . This inconsistency can be resolved, in part, by specifying the different behavioral processes (that is, forms of board involvement in strategic decision making) that could mediate this relationship (Cook & Campbell, 1979) . According to the collaboration model, social ties may ultimately enhance firm performance by enabling boards to extend their involvement beyond decision control to decision management (Fama & Jensen, 1983: 303) . From this perspective, board advice and counsel complement board monitoring as a form of involvement: when involvement extends beyond control to include advisory interactions, directors participate in formulating strategic decisions as well as in evaluating them (through periodic CEO performance reviews, for instance), so that boards influence each major phase of the decision-making process.
Several researchers have recognized the potential value of outside director advice and counsel in generating strategic proposals. Johnson, Daily, and Ellstrand (1996) (Bauer & Green, 1996) . Thus, the quality of board involvement may be higher where monitoring activity is complemented by relatively high levels of director advice and counsel.
This discussion suggests two additional hypotheses. In the first, a positive relationship between board monitoring and subsequent firm performance is predicted; this hypothesis, together with Hypotheses la and lb, addresses whether social ties ultimately reduce firm performance by lowering the level of board monitoring, as suggested by the independent board model. The second hypothesis, together with Hypotheses 2a and 2b, addresses whether social ties ultimately enhance firm performance by raising the level of board advice and counsel, as the collaboration model suggests.
Hypothesis 5. Board monitoring of CEOs will be positively associated with subsequent firm performance.
Hypothesis 6. CEO-board interactions involving advice and counsel on strategic issues will be positively associated with subsequent firm performance.
Incentive Alignment, Board Involvement, and Firm Performance Finally, agency theory also suggests that CEO incentive alignment moderates the effects of board involvement on firm performance. To the extent that CEO incentives can partially substitute for board monitoring as a solution to the agency problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ), higher incentive alignment should lessen the need for monitoring activity, reducing the relationship between monitoring and performance. In effect, where CEO interests are already well aligned with shareholder interests, there is less incremental benefit from a marginal increase in monitoring activity. In addition, incentives should also increase the relationship between CEO advice seeking and performance. From an agency perspective, incentive alignment should focus managerial attention and effort toward using corporate resources in a way that benefits shareholders. Thus, incentives should motivate managers not only to seek advice from outside directors (as argued above), but also to follow through and incorporate useful information and perspectives gained from those interactions into strategic decisions. Thus, Hypothesis 7. The higher the level of CEO incentive alignment, the weaker the positive relationship between board monitoring of a CEO and subsequent firm performance. Hypothesis 8. The higher the level of CEO incentive alignment, the stronger the positive relationship between CEO-board interactions involving advice and counsel on strategic issues and subsequent firm performance.
Overall, then, incentive alignment was expected to moderate relationships between CEO-board social ties, board involvement, and firm performance. As incentive alignment increases, the behavioral and ultimate performance consequences of CEOboard social ties should become more consistent with the collaborative board model and less consistent with the independent board model.
METHODS

Sample and Data Collection
The sample frame for this study consisted of 600 companies randomly selected from the Forbes 1,000 index of U.S. industrial and service firms. I sent a questionnaire to all 600 CEOs from these companies and, to permit interrater reliability assessments, sent a second survey to the outside directors of each company whose CEO responded to the first survey (N = 1,312). Directors who sat on more than one board in the survey sample were asked to respond for only one company (the company was randomly selected and specified in the cover letter); similarly, CEOs who sat on another board in the survey sample were not surveyed twice. The surveys were distributed in April 1995.
Surveys of corporate top managers have often suffered from response rates of less than 25 percent, and response rates above 40 percent are exceptional (Judge & Dobbins, 1995) . To ensure the highest possible number of responses in this case, I took the following steps (Forsythe, 1977; Fowler, 1993 ; Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992): (1) an in-depth pretest (described below) was used to streamline the survey, making it easier and more appealing to complete, (2) requests for participation linked the current study with an ongoing series of surveys on top management issues conducted by a major business school to which hundreds of the surveyed CEOs' and directors' peers had responded, and (3) nonrespondents were sent a new questionnaire about 21 days after the initial mailing. The response rate for CEOs was 44 percent (N = 263), and for directors, it was 43 percent (N = 564). Data on incentive alignment and ownership were obtained from proxy statements, and data on board composition and board structure were obtained from proxies, Standard and Poor's Register, the Dun and Bradstreet Reference, and Who's Who in Finance and Industry. I used the COMPUSTAT and CRSP (Center for Research on Securities Prices) databases to obtain performance, size, and industry data. Archival data were unavailable for 20 of the companies with responding CEOs, leaving a final sample of 243 CEOs and an effective response rate of 41 percent.1 Firms in the final sample represented 27 different two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) categories in both the manufacturing and service sectors, including financial services firms and electric utilities, and ranged from single-product firms to highly diversified conglomerates. In addition, these firms ranged from 260 million to 58 billion in sales, from 500 to 200,000 employees, and from 500 million to 195 billion in assets.
For the 543 companies for which complete archival data were available, I examined whether respondents and nonrespondents differed significantly on variables derived from archival sources using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Siegel & Castel-1 On average, 2.14 directors responded per firm (minimum of 0, maximum of 5). 
Dependent Measures
To enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, I conducted a pretest involving in-depth pilot interviews with 22 top managers and board members (cf. Fowler, 1993: 102). After each individual had completed the pilot questionnaire, I asked him or her to identify questions that were unclear, difficult to answer, or potentially subject to bias. I also used these interviews to ensure that questions were interpreted as expected, to identify improvements to the format of the survey, and to modify its length. To reduce response bias, multiple response formats were used, and items measuring each construct were scattered throughout the survey (DeVellis, 1991). Moreover, drawing on input from the pilot interviews, I carefully worded the final questions to minimize the likelihood of social desirability bias.
Advice and counsel interactions and board monitoring were assessed with two multi-item scales in the CEO survey (see Appendix A for the texts of these scales). In developing the wording of the questions, I drew from available qualitative research suggesting how top managers and directors describe CEO-board interaction and a board's role vis-a-vis management; feedback from the pilot interviews was used to further improve the clarity and face validity of each question. The items were 2 Although this test could not be applied to board leadership structure, a difference of proportions test showed that respondents and nonrespondents did not differ significantly on the proportion of firms with separate CEO and board chair positions (.29 versus .27, p = .37). Respondents and nonrespondents were also not significantly different with respect to the number of board memberships they held (p = .69), and separate analyses confirmed that the subset of firms with a responding CEO and at least one responding outside director (n = 188) was also not significantly different from other firms in the sample frame on the independent and dependent variables measured with archival data. factor-analyzed with the iterated principal factors method. A "scree" test indicated two common factors, and "promax" rotation verified that the advice and monitoring items loaded on different factors as expected, with loadings for each item greater than .5 on one factor and less than .2 on the other. Cronbach's alpha was .88 for the advice and counsel scale and .92 for the monitoring scale, suggesting acceptable interitem reliabilities (Nunnally, 1978) . I estimated advice and monitoring factors using the Bartlett method.
I examined interrater reliability by comparing CEO and outside director responses for the monitoring and advice items, calculating kappa coefficients for each item. Kappa is a correlation coefficient that corrects for the expected level of correlation between raters. The sample included companies with a responding CEO and at least one responding outside director (n = 188). As shown in Table 1 Although prior evidence regarding the effect of firm size on board decision making is also mixed (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) , one might expect the greater complexity involved in governing large organizations to make directors at such firms more inclined to delegate decision-making responsibility, reducing their involvement . Thus, I controlled for sales (measured as a logarithm) in all models. Prior research has suggested that directors lack the structural power to control management decisions when the CEO also serves as board chair, and some evidence links board leadership structure to responsible decision making (Mallette & Fowler, 1992; ; thus, a variable indicating separation of the CEO and board chair positions was included in the monitoring models (this variable was not necessarily expected to influence advice interactions, and separate analyses confirmed that it was unrelated to advice and did not affect the hypothesized results). I also controlled for CEO tenure. CEOs are most likely to consider major strategic changes early in their tenures (Gabarro, 1985) , so length of tenure may be related to board involvement in strategy making. Daily (1996) 
Analysis
Since the proposed relationships between CEOboard social ties, monitoring, and advice interactions were recursive, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis to estimate models of monitoring and advice (Johnston, 1984) . The performance models were estimated using two-stage least squares regression. To the extent 5 In separate analyses, I restricted this measure to ownership by institutions classified as "pressure-resistant" by Kochhar and David (1996) , including public pension funds, mutual funds, and foundations. The results were substantively unchanged from results presented below. that the models of board monitoring, advice, and performance encompassed a larger system of equations in which some variables that predict board monitoring and/or advice might be independently related to performance, OLS regression could yield biased estimates in modeling performance (Johnston, 1984) . Two-stage least squares regression corrects for this bias by generating reducedform estimates of monitoring, advice, and prior performance and then including predicted values from these equations as instruments in a second-stage equation estimating subsequent firm performance.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are displayed in Table 2 . The results of multiple regression analyses of board monitoring and advice and counsel interactions are provided in Table 3 . The first set of results was inconsistent with the independent board model. Neither the level of CEO-board friendship ties nor the portion of a firm's board appointed after its CEO was significantly related to the level of board monitoring activity. The main effects did support the collaborative board model, however. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, friendship ties and subsequent board appointments were both positively related to the level of advice and counsel interactions on strategic issues.
The results also generally supported the hypothesized effect of the interaction between social ties and incentive alignment on board monitoring and advice interactions (Hypotheses 3-4). As CEO ownership or long-term incentive plan compensation increased, the negative effect of friendship ties on board monitoring grew weaker (i.e., more positive), and the positive effect of such ties on advice interactions grew stronger. Similarly, for two of the interaction terms, as incentives increased the negative effect of subsequent board appointments on monitoring grew weaker, and the positive effect of subsequent board appointments on advice interactions grew stronger. A further analysis of simple effects (Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan, 1990) indicated that both social tie variables were insignificant in predicting advice interactions at low levels of CEO ownership or long-term incentive plan compensation (for example, at zero), and the significant effects in model 6 indicate that social ties were positively related to advice and counsel interactions at average levels of each incentive variable. Conversely, although the effects of social ties on board monitoring were insignificant at average levels of CEO ownership and long-term incentive plan compensation, they became significant at low levels of incentive alignment. In general, these results support the proposition that incentive alignment moderates the effects of CEO-board social ties on board involvement. When incentive alignment is absent, the independent board model is more appropriate in predicting Further results showed that CEO incentive alignment moderated relationships between social ties and board involvement: Higher levels of CEO ownership or long-term incentive compensation further enhanced the positive relationship between social ties and board advice while reducing the negative relationship between social ties and board monitoring. This moderation is consistent with the view that management incentives decrease the need for board monitoring as a control mechanism and also motivate CEOs to use their social capital (their social ties to directors) as a resource in strategic decision making. Although some prior research has linked management incentives to corporate strategy and overall firm performance (e.g., Abowd, 1990; Gibbs, 1993) , the present study extends this literature by addressing how incentives affect behavioral processes (here, advice seeking) that may mediate these relationships.
The It might be suggested that CEOs are more comfortable seeking advice from their friends and appointees because those individuals may be less experienced or knowledgeable than themselves, and thus less capable of challenging them. To explore the validity of this interpretation, I analyzed the effect of director expertise and experience on the observed relationships. I used four indicators of expertise, averaged across directors (Finkelstein, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) : the number of different management positions a director had held, the number of different functional areas the director had worked in, the number of years the director had served as a top manager, and the director's level of education. Factor analysis confirmed that all four indicators loaded on the same factor. A separate regression analysis showed that the effects of social ties on advice and counsel interactions were unchanged when director expertise and experience were controlled for. Also, as shown in Appendix B, the interaction between director expertise and social ties had a positive effect on advice interactions, indicating that social ties were especially likely to increase advice when the level of director expertise was relatively high. These results are inconsistent with the view that social ties increase advice seeking because boards that have more social ties with CEOs are populated by less experienced or knowledgeable directors whose input might be less threatening to the CEOs.
Future Research Directions
Although this study focused on the administrative role of boards, future research should examine how CEO-board cooperation and control affect a board's ability to exercise its other major functions, including its role in managing resource dependence and enhancing organizational legitimacy. One could investigate, for instance, whether advice and counsel interactions between CEOs and manager-directors (outside directors who serve as top managers at another firm) might help managers to identify opportunities for interorganizational cooperation (for instance, strategic alliances) that secure needed resources and resolve interdependencies between firms. Conversely, CEO-board relationships characterized only by independent board control might reduce the likelihood that CEOs and manager-directors will identify and pursue such opportunities. Similarly, although in prior research on interlocking directorates the assumption has been that managers use outside directors to secure needed resources from the environment (for a review, see Mizruchi [1996] ), the effectiveness of this cooptation mechanism may hinge on the particular content of CEO-board relationships.
Studies are also needed that examine how different kinds of CEO-board relationships are perceived by internal and external stakeholders and the consequences of these relationships for organizational legitimacy. There is evidence that institutional investors respond positively to changes in board structure that are thought to increase a board's monitoring capacity (for a review, see Westphal and Zajac [1998] ). It is uncertain, however, whether external constituents also assess the actual behavioral processes occurring in CEO-board relation-1999 ships (for example, monitoring and advice giving) in evaluating corporate governance. Given the potential decoupling of formal board structure and actual behavior (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; , it is important to examine the depth at which external stakeholders evaluate corporate boards. According to an institutional perspective, firms with strong CEO-board social ties could satisfy external constituents by adopting formal structures that implied independent control (the socially legitimate CEO-board relationship) but could decouple these structures from actual board processes.
The findings of this study may also suggest new directions for research on management incentives. The confirmed interactions between incentive alignment and social ties suggest that incentives can be more effective in raising performance when managers have more social connections to draw upon for information and advice. Compensation researchers should further explore the role of social capital as an important contingency factor in the effectiveness of incentive compensation plans. Researchers investigating management incentives in particular might explicitly consider how managers are either constrained or enabled in responding to economic incentives by the social relationships in which they are embedded. Research is also needed that explores in more detail how incentives affect CEO behavior such as advice seeking. Stewardship theory suggests that managers are motivated by the intrinsic satisfaction their work provides rather than by extrinsic rewards (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). This view might appear inconsistent with evidence that incentive compensation increases the tendency for CEOs to draw on their social ties for advice. However, it is possible that incentives influence CEOs' behavior primarily by communicating goals and directing the CEOs' attention toward them, and not strictly by motivating the CEOs to increase their financial compensation. Future studies should examine the psychological mechanisms that mediate the effects of incentives on CEO behavior toward boards.
Limitations and Managerial Implications
Several limitations of the study should be acknowledged. First, this research focused on advice interactions initiated by CEOs. A somewhat different set of social and economic factors may lead directors to initiate such interactions. Separate questions in the survey indicated that a large portion of such advice interactions (approximately 92 percent, on the average) were initiated by the CEOs, a finding that is consistent with prior descriptive surveys suggesting that such interactions are typically CEO initiated (Alderfer, 1986; Bacon & Brown, 1975; Demb & Neubauer, 1992) . Nevertheless, board-initiated advice giving does occur, and it could become a more significant form of involvement in the future. Second, this study did not address the specific content or quality of board advice-for instance, I did not examine whether and when directors furnished information about developments in the external environment, as opposed to giving opinions about strategic options for coping with them. In this study, I did not seek to explain variation in the value or quality of advice or the accuracy of information furnished by outside directors, qualities that could moderate the effects of collaboration on performance; unique information or experience provided by outsiders could represent an especially valuable resource (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) . Finally, as noted above, in this research I did not investigate how board collaboration and control affected a board's ability to perform certain external roles, such as managing resource dependence or building organizational legitimacy.
The present findings may have important normative implications for corporate boards. Institutional investors, management consultants, and the popular press have all strongly advocated greater board independence from management. Directors with close ties to management are routinely characterized in cynical terms as "pals of the CEO" or "handpicked appointees," and their relationships to CEOs are described as overly "chummy" (e.g., Wall Street Journal, 1993: B1; 1995: B1; 1996). This study suggests that in fact board effectiveness and ultimately, firm performance may be enhanced by close, trusting CEO-board relationships combined with moderate to high levels of CEO incentive alignment. Thus, rather than dividing top managers and outside directors into independent groups, a firm might profit by using team development techniques that unify managers and directors into a single, cohesive team. Interestingly, although such interventions are commonly used to develop teamwork among lower-level employees, they have not been applied at the highest levels of organizations.
Overall, this study contributes to the corporate governance literature by providing empirical evidence on how CEOs and outside directors collaborate in the strategic decision making process and then demonstrating that such collaboration independently and positively contributes to firm performance. The results challenge dominant assumptions in the prior empirical literature on boards by showing how social ties in CEO-board relationships can enhance rather than diminish board involvement and firm performance by encouraging advice seeking in the strategic decision making pro-cess. More generally, the findings suggest the value of conducting rigorous empirical research that examines the behavioral processes and dynamics that underlie corporate governance.
